ABSTRACT
Non-technical summaryWe summarize some of the past year's most important findings within climate change-related research. New research has improved our understanding about the remaining options to achieve the Paris Agreement goals, through overcoming political barriers to carbon pricing, taking into account non-CO2 factors, a well-designed implementation of demand-side and nature-based solutions, resilience building of ecosystems and the recognition that climate change mitigation costs can be justified by benefits to the health of humans and nature alone. We consider new insights about what to expect if we fail to include a new dimension of fire extremes and the prospect of cascading climate tipping elements.Technical summaryA synthesis is made of 10 topics within climate research, where there have been significant advances since January 2020. The insights are based on input from an international open call with broad disciplinary scope. Findings include: (1) the options to still keep global warming below 1.5 °C;(2) the impact of non-CO2 factors in global warming;(3) a new dimension of fire extremes forced by climate change;(4) the increasing pressure on interconnected climate tipping elements;(5) the dimensions of climate justice;(6) political challenges impeding the effectiveness of carbon pricing;(7) demand-side solutions as vehicles of climate mitigation;(8) the potentials and caveats of nature-based solutions;(9) how building resilience of marine ecosystems is possible;and (10) that the costs of climate change mitigation policies can be more than justified by the benefits to the health of humans and nature.Social media summaryHow do we limit global warming to 1.5 °C and why is it crucial? See highlights of latest climate science.
ABSTRACT
Whereas scholars have typically modeled climate change as a global collective action challenge, we offer a dynamic theory of climate politics based on the present and future revaluation of assets. Climate politics can be understood as a contest between owners of assets that accelerate climate change, such as fossil fuel plants, and owners of assets vulnerable to climate change, such as coastal property. To date, obstruction by “climate-forcing” asset holders has been a large barrier to effective climate policy. But as climate change and decarbonization policies proceed, holders of both climate-forcing and “climate-vulnerable” assets stand to lose some or even all of their assets' value over time, and with them, the basis of their political power. This dynamic contest between opposing interests is likely to intensify in many sites of political contestation, from the subnational to transnational levels. As it does so, climate politics will become increasingly existential, potentially reshaping political alignments within and across countries. Such shifts may further undermine the Liberal International Order (LIO);as countries develop pro-climate policies at different speeds and magnitudes, they will have incentives to diverge from existing arrangements over trade and economic integration.